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Abstract—We consider the problem of communication over a
multi-path network in the presence of a causal adversary. The
limited-view causal adversary is able to eavesdrop on a subset
of links and also jam on a potentially overlapping subset of
links based on the current and past information. To ensure that
the communication takes place reliably and secretly, resilient
network codes with necessary redundancy are needed. We study
two adversarial models – additive and overwrite jamming and we
optionally assume passive feedback from decoder to encoder, i.e.,
the encoder sees everything that the decoder sees. The problem
assumes transmissions are in the large alphabet regime. For both
jamming models, we find the capacity under four scenarios
– reliability without feedback, reliability and secrecy without
feedback, reliability with passive feedback, reliability and secrecy
with passive feedback. We observe that, in comparison to the non-
causal setting, the capacity with a causal adversary is strictly
increased for a wide variety of parameter settings and present
our intuition through several examples.
Index Terms—adversary, jamming, secrecy, causal, feedback
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following example of a communication prob-
lem. Alice wishes to wirelessly transmit a message m to
receiver Bob by communicating over C different frequencies.
Their communication is intercepted by a limited-view adver-
sary Calvin who has his receiver tuned to subset ZR of the
frequencies, and can jam a potentially overlapping subset ZW
of frequencies by adding transmissions on them. Due to the
nature of the channel, Calvin can only see the signal up to the
current time to maliciously determine his jamming strategy for
the current time instant. We wish to answer questions of the
following form: “Without knowing which frequencies Calvin
is monitoring/jamming, what is the maximum communication
rate at which Bob can decode Alice’s message successfully,
while keeping the message secret from Calvin?”. This example
corresponds to a model in which Alice wishes to communicate
reliably and secretly with Bob over a channel with an eaves-
dropper/additive jammer. A variant of the problem is when,
additionally, Alice can also hear the channel outputs (she too
is monitoring all C frequencies, and therefore has passive
feedback). In this variant we wish to understand whether this
knowledge can improve the best possible rate.
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We model this problem as that of communication over a
noiseless multi-path network consisting of C parallel links
between the sender and the receiver. As mentioned above,
the adversary Calvin can eavesdrop on a subset ZR and jam
on a subset ZW . Subsets ZRW , ZRO and ZWO1 represent
the links that Calvin can both eavesdrop on and jam, only
eavesdrop on (but not jam) and only jam (but not eavesdrop
on) respectively. In addition, the sizes of ZRW , ZRO and ZWO
are bounded from zrw, zro and zwo. The adversarial vector ~z
= (zrw, zro, zwo) measures Calvin’s power. Moreover, Calvin
also knows the encoding and decoding schemes so that he may
mimic Alice’s behavior to confuse Bob. We consider a causal
constraint on Calvin’s behaviors, i.e., Calvin can only use the
knowledge of symbols up to the current time slot to decide
his jamming strategy.
Related work
Reliable communication: The problem of reliable com-
munication (with no secrecy constraints) against a malicious
eavesdropping adversary has been well-studied in the past. The
maximum possible rate has been characterized under various
settings – both causal and non-causal. The non-causal setting is
relatively well understood both in the classical error-correction
setup [1]–[4] and the network error correction setting [5]–[8].
A key feature of these results is that in many of these models,
Calvin can decrease the capacity by twice the number of links
he controls, by “pushing” Alice’s transmissions towards the
“nearest plausible transmission”, thereby inflicting “double-
damage”. This heuristic also suggests an intuitive scheme for
Bob’s decoder – try to detect as many corrupted links as
possible and treat those as erasures – in this case Calvin’s
actions would only cause “single damage”. Critically, Calvin’s
ability to cause double damage depends on his ability to be
able to see the full transmission for each link in ZR before
determining the optimal jamming strategy for ZW .
In contrast, in the causal setting, by using stochastic encod-
ing, the adversary may not be able to predict some of the future
symbols, which can then be used to detect the set ZW . Causal
adversaries for classical channel coding and network coding
1RW, RO, WO stand for “read and write”, “read only” and “write only”
respectively. In a wireless setting these sets may correspond to different
physical constraints on Calvin’s ability to eavesdrop on or jam certain
frequencies. In distributed storage system setting these sets may correspond
to Calvin having or read-or-write, read-only, or write-only permissions on
different devices.
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problems have also been well studied [9], [10]. In [11], the
authors consider causal, omniscient adversaries for multicast
networks, and characterize precise conditions under which any
positive rate is achievable. Further, they also provide some
upper and lower bounds on the rates. However, the question
of characterizing the capacity in general networks containing
malicious jammers remains open in the main.
Reliable and secret communication: The problem of both
reliable and secure communication over a network has also
received considerable attention in the literature. For reliable,
secure communication, [12] characterize the capacity when
zro = zwo = 0. In [6], the authors consider another extreme
when the set of edges that are eavesdropped and jammed
are disjoint, i.e., zrw = 0. The capacity for a general ~z =
(zrw, zro, zwo) for a non-causal adversary with no feedback
has been considered in a previous work [8] by the authors of
this work.
Another model that is related to our setup is that of
an adversarial wiretap (AWTP) channel [13], wherein the
adversary can eavesdrop up to a given fraction of symbols
sent over a channel, and can jam another (possibly inter-
secting) fraction of symbols based on what he eavesdrops.
There are two key differences from our work: (i) the authors
only consider the problem of additive jamming, and (ii)
the capacity characterization is parametrized with “coarser
granularity”, in that instead of parametrizing the problem in
terms of (zrw, zro, zwo), the authors parametrize it in terms
of (zrw + zro, zrw + zwo), i.e., in terms of the total number of
eavesdropped and jammed links.
Another problem that is closely related to ours is that of
Secure Message Transmission (SMT) [14], [15]. Under SMT, a
sender aims to communicate a message reliably and secretly to
the receiver over multiple parallel links out of which a fraction
of links are eavesdropped and another (possibly intersecting)
fraction are jammed. There are a several differences from
our model: (i) The SMT problem focusses on computing a
lower bound on the number of links that are required for
reliable and secret communication of one message symbol, and
usually do not provide information-theoretically tight capacity
characterizations, (ii) most schemes are multi-round, 2-way
protocols where the receiver can (actively) talk to the sender
(though some protocols are indeed 1-way), (iii) the problem
parametrization is again in terms of (zrw + zro, zrw + zwo).
Our contributions
We consider the problem of causal jamming with an
optional secrecy requirement. Taking cue from our prior
work [8], we consider a finer characterization of the adver-
sary’s power by classifying his controlled links into read-
only, write-only, and read-and-write subsets. We examine this
problem in two settings – additive and overwrite jamming.
The motivation for an additive adversary comes from wireless
networks, where, the adversary may add his own signal to the
transmitted signal. On the other hand, the overwrite adversary
models the adversarial action in a wired network, where
the adversary is more likely to completely replace the true
transmitted packets with fake packets of his choice. 2
In the setting without feedback, Theorems 1-4 state the
capacity when secrecy is not required. Theorems 5 and 6
state our results with secrecy requirement and also without
feedback. When passive feedback is available to the encoder,
we characterize the capacity in Theorems 7 and 8, and also
consider secrecy in Theorems 9 and 10.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we illustrate the role of causality in limiting the adversary’s
power by giving four examples. We formally define the
problem in Section III and state our main results with short
proof sketches in Section IV. The detailed proofs are presented
in Appendices A-E.
II. KEY IDEAS
The techniques used in this paper build upon the ideas
introduced in [8], [12]. In this section, we present a short
intuitive overview of some of these ideas via toy examples.
A. Ideas for achievability
1) Reed-Solomon codes: The application of Reed-Solomon
codes [1] (or in fact, any MDS code) to network error-
correction is well-studied. These are particularly useful when
the parameters zrw, zro, and zwo correspond to a “strong
adversary” that can choose both the set ZW and the corrupted
codewords in a “worst-case” manner.3 If Bob were able to
detect the set ZW with high probability, this would allow him
to treat the set ZW as “erasures”, thus enabling a rate of C−zw
to be achievable – indeed, this is what some of the schemes
we present attempt to do.4
2) Pairwise-hashing: When the adversary has limited
knowledge of the transmitted codewords, in some settings a
pairwise-hashing scheme is useful in detecting the set ZW and
enabling treating the corrupted set of links as erasures [12].The
following example presents the main intuition here.
Example 1 (Limited-view non-causal adversary [8]). Con-
sider a network with three links L1, L2 and L3, and an
adversary Calvin that can both read and write on exactly
one link, i.e., zrw = 1 and zwo = zro = 0. Even though
the zero-error capacity of this network is C − 2zw = 1, we
argue that in the vanishing error probability setup, the link
ZRW can be detected and the rate is C − zrw = 2. The
codeword sent on the link Li consists of three parts – the i-th
symbol from a (3, 2) Reed-Solomon codeword Ui, a random
key Ki, and hash values Hi1, Hi2, Hi3 with Hij = h(Ki, Uj)
2Notice that for a write only link, the overwrite adversary knows the
output codewords while the additive adversary has no way to learn the output
codewords.
3The simplest example of a strong adversary is an omniscient one, i.e.,
when zr = C. However, the exact parameter settings that correspond to a
strong adversary depend on the flavour of the problem being considered, e.g.
causal vs non-causal, overwrite vs additive etc.
4It is important here to make a distinction between zero error probability
(i.e., robustness to worst-case errors) and vanishing error probability require-
ments. In the former case one can use the Singleton bound [2] to see that
the best achievable rate is C − 2zw regardless of what the adversary knows.
However, the Singleton bound requires Calvin to know the entire transmission.
Hence, in the latter setup, a higher rate may be achievable if the adversary
has limited eavesdropping power.
for a suitably designed non-linear hash function h(·, ·). Upon
receiving the codewords, Bob checks consistency within each
pair of links (Li, Lj) by verifying if the received values satisfy
both Hij = h(Ki, Uj) and Hji = h(Kj , Ui). Without loss of
generality, assume that Calvin choses ZRW = {L1} (unknown
to Alice and Bob) and corrupts (U1,K1, H11, H12, H13). Note
that since Calvin does not know the values of K2 and K3, it
can be shown that the probability that he can satisfy the checks
for H21 and H31 is small if he choses to change U1. On the
other hand, links L2 and L3 cross-verify all of their mutual
hashes successfully, thus isolating L1 as the corrupted link. As
a result, Bob can successfully decode the message by treating
U1 as an erasure for the Reed-Solomon code.
The scheme in the Example 1 exploits the adversary know-
ing only a subset of what the decoder sees. In the problems
considered in this paper, the additional assumption of causality
further limits his view and enables a higher rate. For example,
in the three link network above, even if we permit the
adversary to read all the links (i.e., zro = 2, zrw = 1), the fact
that the adversary does not know the random keys K1,K2,K3
while perturbing the selected Ui prevent him from being able
to deterministically match the corresponding pairwise hashes.
This allows the decoder to detect the corrupted link.
3) Adversary detection with passive feedback: We use a
similar idea as above in the setting with passive feedback (i.e.,
the encoder overhears all past symbols received by the decoder
before transmitting the current symbol). In this case, the rate
C − zw is possible for an even larger set of parameters by
using a multi-round scheme that lets Bob detect the set of
corrupted links.
Example 2 (Adversary detection). Consider a two link net-
work with zrw = 1, zro = zwo = 0. Here, no positive rate
is possible without feedback (c.f. Example 4). However, with
passive feedback, a rate of 1 is possible. To see this, consider a
two-round scheme. Alice first generates two independent and
uniformly random keys K1 and K2. Next, for a message M ,
Alice transmits (M,K1) and (M,K2) on links L1 and L2 re-
spectively in the first round. Now, Alice sees both the received
codewords, say (Mˆ1, Kˆ1) and (Mˆ2, Kˆ2), and determines if any
of the links were corrupted by Calvin. In the second round,
Alice sends hash H = (h(Mˆ1, Kˆ1), h(Mˆ2, Kˆ2)) on all links
that she determines to be uncorrupted in the first round, while
sending uniformly random bits having the same length as H
on the corrupted links. This lets Bob detect and ignore any
link corrupted in the first round and decode the message from
the uncorrupted link(s). Note that since Calvin sees only one
link, he cannot ensure that the second round codeword on any
link corrupted by him satisfies the hash equation.
The intuition is that the encoder can use his feedback
to first determine which links have been corrupted by the
adversary and then convey this information to the decoder by
sending values consistent with the hash function only on the
uncorrupted links (and inconsistent values on others).
4) Mixing keys for secrecy: In the setting where informa-
tion theoretic secrecy is demanded in addition to reliability,
we use standard one-time pad arguments that mix the message
with random keys. Since the adversary can see up to zr links,
as long as the key rate is at least zr, we show that the secrecy
requirement is met. The error correcting code is chosen so that
both the message and the key are decoded by the receiver. As a
result, as long as the overall rate decreases by zr, both secrecy
and reliability are simultaneously met. 5
5) Secret key extraction via passive feedback: A surprising
effect of passive feedback is that it allows Alice and Bob to
extract secret keys from corrupted links as long as the received
codeword on the link is hidden from Calvin. This allows for
simultaneous reliable and secret transmission at rates higher
than that achievable by just mixing zr random keys with the
message. The following example of an additive adversary (i.e.,
on ZWO links, Calvin adds an error vector to the transmitted
codeword without necessarily knowing what was sent by
Alice) illustrates the key idea that enables achieving the rate
min{C − zr, C − zw} in the additive setting.
Example 3 (Secret key extraction). Consider a two link
network with zro = zwo = 1. Here, no positive rate is possible
for simultaneous reliable and secret transmission without feed-
back. However, with passive feedback, the following multi-
round protocol achieves an asymptotic rate of 1. Let the
message M = M1M2 . . .Mn be a length-n binary vector. The
transmission is divided into three-stages. In the i-th round of
the first stage, Alice generates a random bit Kj and sends
X1,j = Mj on the first link and X2,j = Mj ⊕ Kj on
the second link. After each bit is received, Alice checks if
any of the two links have been corrupted by Calvin. Let c
be the first round where Calvin has corrupted one of the
links, say link Li, i.e., Yi,c = Xi,c ⊕ Ec for some Ec. Alice
now starts the second stage of transmission. In each round
j = c+ 1, . . . , n+ 1, Alice sends Xi,j = Kj on the corrupted
link Li and Xi⊕1+1,j = Mj−1 + Y1,j−1 on the uncorrupted
link. Note that since Calvin has revealed that Li ∈ ZWO,
Alice knows that Calvin cannot infer the values of Yi,j as
each Xi,j is independent of Xi⊕1+1,1, . . . , Xi⊕1+1,n+1. Thus,
in the second stage of transmission, Yi,j acts as a shared key
for secret transmission on the uncorrupted link for the (i+1)-
th round. Finally, in the third stage, Alice transmits the values
of c and i by using the reliable transmission scheme (without
secrecy) of Example 2.
B. Ideas for the converse
1) Cut-set bound: Since the adversary can corrupt zw links,
he can replace the codewords on the links in ZW by uniformly
random symbols independent of the original codewords. By a
simple argument based on Fano’s inequality, one can conclude
that no rate higher than C − zw is possible if the error
probability must vanish to 0.
2) A symmetrization argument [9]: A tighter converse than
the above can be obtained when the adversary is “powerful
enough”. For example, in the setting without feedback, if the
5Note that decreasing the rate by zr suffices even when Alice does not know
the set of links corrupted by Calvin. Surprisingly, when Alice can learn the
set of links corrupted by Calvin in previous rounds of a multi-round scheme,
the secrecy capacity may be higher (as seen in Example 3)
Y Dec(Y)
Multipath Network
Received 
codeword
Decoder
X3
X1
X5
X4
m
k
message
Enc(m, k)
Encoder
X
Transmitted 
codeword
random key
X2
X6
X7
Fig. 1: System diagram for a multi-path network consisting of C
parallel links (C = 7 in this example).
adversary can corrupt at least half of the links, no positive
rate is possible. The argument here is similar to the Singleton
Bound [2] and allows for stochastic encoding as well. The
following example illustrates the idea.
Example 4 (Symmetrization with a causal adversary). Con-
sider a three link network under attack from a causal adversary
with zrw = 2 and zwo = zro = 0. It is straightforward
to see that the pairwise hashing scheme can be foiled by
the adversary – he can ensure that the two links in ZW
satisfy each other’s hashes and thus there is no reliable way
for the decoder to determine the uncorrupted link. More
generally, for any coding scheme, the adversary can follow
a symmetrization strategy as follows. Suppose the encoder
maps message m to codewords x1, x2, x3 according to an en-
coder conditional probability distribution pX1,X2,X3|M .
6 The
adversary first chooses a message m′ uniformly at random
from the set of possible messages and draws codewords
x′1, x
′
2, x
′
3 according to the conditional probability distribution
pX1,X2,X3|M (x
′
1, x
′
2, x
′
3|m′). Next, the adversary chooses ZW
to be either {L1} or {L2, L3} with equal probability and
replaces the codewords (xi : i ∈ ZW ) by (x′i : i ∈ ZW ). Now,
from the decoder’s point of view, given the received codewords
y1, y2, y3, the messages m and m′ are equally likely. Thus, the
decoder cannot reliably determine whether the true message
is m or m′ and as a result the error probability is bounded
away from 0 for any code of positive rate.
When feedback is present, an argument similar to the above
holds, albeit for a smaller set of adversarial parameters. With
feedback, since the code operates over multiple rounds, the
adversary needs to be sufficiently powerful to be able to
fool the decoder even when the encoder knows the received
codewords on the links in ZW .
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The multi-path network model and the encoding/decoding
process are illustrated in Figure 1. In our setting, the multi-path
network consists of C parallel, directed links L1, L2,. . . ,LC .
For the equal link capacity network, each link is of unit
capacity. For a general unequal link capacity network, the
capacity of link Li is denoted by ui, ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , C}. The
total capacity of a unequal link capacity network is defined
6Note that both a deterministic encoder as well as an encoder using pairwise
hashing can be viewed as special cases under this formalism.
as Cˆ bits per use, where Cˆ :=
C∑
i=1
ui. In particular, the total
capacity of the equal link capacity is C bits per use. We also
optionally consider passive feedback available causally at the
transmitter, i.e., the transmitted overhears the received symbols
at the decoder causally.
We begin by formally describing the encoder, decoder, and
possible adversarial actions for a code for block length n, i.e.,
for a code that operates over n time steps and r rounds (r ≤ n
with r = 1 denoting the case without feedback). For simplicity,
we focus on networks with equal link capacity and deal with
the unequal link capacity case only informally.
In the following, matrices X = [X(1)X(2) . . . X(r)] and
Y = [Y (1)Y (2) . . . Y (r)] respectively denote the collection
of transmitted and received codewords across all links for
all rounds. Here, X(k) (resp. Y (k)) is a matrix whose i-th
row ~X(k)i (resp. ~Y
(k)
i ) denotes the transmitted (resp. received)
codeword on link Li in the k-th round.
A. Encoder
The transmitter Alice encodes a nR-bit message m, where
R stands for the message rate. The message m is assumed
to be uniformly distributed from {0, 1}nR. To perform a
stochastic encoding, a random key k, which is uniformed
distributed from the finite field F2t , is also generated by Alice.
In the first round, Alice encodes m into a collection of
C n-length codewords ~X(1)1 , ~X
(1)
2 , . . . ,
~X
(1)
C . In this case, the
encoder function for the first round takes the form
Ψ(1)e : {0, 1}Rn × F2t → {0, 1}Cn
(1)
.
If no feedback is present, no further actions are performed by
Alice. In this case, n(1) = n.
If feedback is present, in each subsequent round k, Alice’s
codewords ~X(k)1 , ~X
(k)
2 , . . . ,
~X
(k)
C are each of length n
(k) and
are determined by the message m, the random key k, and the
feedback from prior rounds Y (1) . . . Y (k−1). Formally, Alice’s
encoder for the i-th round takes the form
Ψ(k)e : {0, 1}Rn × F2t ×
k−1∏
j=1
{0, 1}Cn(j) → {0, 1}Cn(k) ,
where,
∑r
k=1 n
(k) = n.
B. Decoder
The decoder Bob receives the code matrix Y , which may
be different from X and outputs a reconstruction mˆ. The
decoding function takes the form
γe(Y ) : {0, 1}nC → {0, 1}nR .
C. Adversary
Out of the C links of the multi-path network, the adversary
Calvin is able to eavesdrop (but not jam) a subset ZRO of
size zro, jam (but not eavesdrop) a subset ZWO of size zwo,
both eavesdrop and jam a subset ZRW of zrw. Calvin’s power
is measured by the adversarial vector ~z = (zrw, zro, zwo).
The encoding and decoding strategies are known to Calvin.
However, the two end users do not know how Calvin chooses
ZRO, ZWO and ZRW in advance.
1) Additive and Overwrite Jamming: An additive jammer
may induce additive bias on the transmitted codeword. Assume
the codeword transmitted on Li is
−→
X i and the bias is
−→
E i, the
received codeword would be
−→
Y i =
−→
X i +
−→
E i. On the other
hand, an overwrite adversary can overwrite the transmitted
codeword by its own one directly. If the codeword is
−→
X i and
the bias is
−→
E i, the received codeword will be
−→
Y i =
−→
E i.
2) Causal Adversary: We restrict the adversary to be
causal, i.e., the adversary is only allowed to jam the symbol
of current time slot based on the observation of current and
past time slots. More specifically, at any given time t, given a
C×n code matrix X , the adversary can use the knowledge of
only the first t symbols from rows in subset ZRW ∪ ZRO in
order to jam the t-th symbols from the rows in ZRW ∪ZWO.
In contrast, a non-causal adversary [16] enjoys the full
knowledge of all the symbols in the rows belonging to
ZRW ∪ZRO at all times. Obviously, the non-causal adversary
has a stronger power and leads to a potentially lower rate.
3) Reliability and Security: Instead of a zero-error prob-
ability, we aim to achieve an ε-error probability. The com-
munication is reliable if for any ε > 0, by choosing n large
enough, there exists a code of block length n such that the
error probability Pe = Pr[m 6= mˆ] < ε.
In terms of security, we aim to achieve the information-
theoretically perfect secrecy. Assume the subset Calvin can
eavesdrop is ZR = {i1, i2, · · · , izr} and the sub-codeword on
ZR links is XZR = [
−→
XTi1
−→
XTi2 · · ·
−→
XTizr ]
T . To achieve security,
the mutual-information between the message and Calvin’s
observation should be zero, i.e. I (M ;XZR) = 0.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present the main results and sketch
their proofs. The full proofs of the results can be found
in Appendices B-E. We group our results into four parts –
reliability without feedback, reliability and secrecy without
feedback, reliability with feedback, as well as reliability and
secrecy with feedback. For each of these cases, we discuss
the additive jamming and the overwrite jamming separately.
Finally, we give a “complete” characterization of the problem
in Table I.
A. Reliability without feedback
For both additive and overwrite jammers, we obtain a
two-part rate-region, i.e. weak adversary regime and strong
adversary regime. The weak adversary regime for additive
jamming is
Zaddw,nf = {~z : zwo + 2zrw < C} ,
whereas for overwrite jamming, the weak adversary regime is
Zoww,nf = {~z : 2zwo + 2zrw < C} .
The strong adversary regime equals the complement of the
weak adversary regime. In the weak adversary regime, the
achievability relies on erasure codes coupled with the pairwise-
hashing scheme. The rate is limited to zero in the strong
adversary regime.
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Fig. 2: The rate regions for additive and overwrite causal jamming
adversaries (Theorem 1 and 2): for additive (resp. overwrite) jam-
ming, the pentahedron V3OV2V5V4 (resp. OV4V5V2V7V6) represents
the weak adversary regime, while the polyhedron V3V4V5V1 (resp.
V1V3V5V4V7V6) represents the strong adversary regime.
First we consider the scenario when reliable communication
is the only objective. For equal and unequal link capacity
networks, for any ~z = (zrw, zro, zwo) such that zrw + zro +
zwo ≤ C, the maximum achievable reliable rates for additive
and overwrite jamming are characterized in the following.
Theorem 1 (Additive jamming for equal link capacities).
Under additive causal jamming, the maximum achievable
reliable rate is
Raddj (C, ~z) =
{
C − (zrw + zwo), if ~z ∈ Zaddw,nf ,
0, otherwise.
Theorem 2 (Overwrite jamming for equal link capacities).
Under overwrite causal jamming, the maximum achievable
reliable rate is
Rowj (C, ~z) =
{
C − (zrw + zwo), if ~z ∈ Zoww,nf ,
0, otherwise.
For additive jamming and overwrite jamming, the two-part
rate-regions are slightly different though the expressions are
similar. Note that, regardless of the coding scheme, the best
rate that we can hope for is C − zw since the adversary
can corrupt any zw links. In the weak adversary regime, the
best rate C − zw is indeed achievable. To achieve it, the
encoder would use an erasure code to encode the message and
apply the pairwise-hashing scheme to help detect errors. The
decoder detects the corrupted links first (which are regarded
as erasures) and then the message will be retrieved from the
sub-codewords carried by the uncorrupted links.
However, no coding scheme (including pairwise-hashing)
works for the strong adversary regime. The adversary can
always adopt a “symmetrization” strategy so that the decoder
is unable to distinguish the correct message and the fake mes-
sage. The proof of the converse relies on an argument based
on the Singleton bound [2] that we present in Appendix B.
Unequal link capacities: To incur maximum damage, the
adversary may choose links with highest sum-rate to attack.
We define the the total capacity of any subset of size w links as
Uw. Different choice of the subsets may incur different values
of Uw. Typically, the notation (Uw)max is used to denote
the maximum value of Uw, i.e. the largest sum-capacity of
all possible subsets of size w. Similar to the situation with
equal link capacities, the main idea is also encoding by erasure
codes as well as adopting “pairwise-hashing” scheme to detect
adversarial attacks. However, the only difference is that the
maximum rate depends on Calvin’s ability to corrupt the links
with largest sum-capacities.
Theorem 3 (Additive jamming for unequal link capacities).
Under additive causal jamming, the maximum achievable
reliable rate is
Raddj (Cˆ, ~z) =
{
Cˆ − (U(zrw+zwo))max, if ~z ∈ Zaddw,nf
0, otherwise.
Theorem 4 (Overwrite jamming and unequal link capacities).
Under overwrite causal jamming, the maximum achievable
reliable rate is
Rowj (Cˆ, ~z) =
{
Cˆ − (U(zrw+zwo))max, if ~z ∈ Zoww,nf ,
0, otherwise.
B. Reliability and secrecy without feedback
In this section, we consider the scenario wherein Calvin
tries to learn some information about Alice’s message from the
links he eavesdrops. Besides reliable communication, we also
want to prevent Calvin from gaining any information about
the message. For this, we consider information-theoretically
perfect secrecy, which requires that I (M ;XZR) = 0, where
XZR is the sub-codeword transmitted on the links in ZR. In the
following, we characterize the reliable and secure rate region
in the equal link capacity case for the causal adversary.
Theorem 5 (Additive, causal jamming with secrecy, equal
link capacities). Under additive causal jamming, the maximum
achievable reliable and secret rate is
Raddj,s (~z) =
{
(C − (zwo + zro + 2zrw))+ if ~z ∈ Zaddw,nf ,
0 otherwise,
where (x)+ is defined as (x)+ = max {0, x}.
Theorem 6 (Overwrite, causal jamming with secrecy, equal
link capacities). Under overwrite causal jamming, the maxi-
mum achievable reliable and secret rate is
Rowj,s(~z) =
{
(C − (zwo + zro + 2zrw))+ if ~z ∈ Zoww,nf ,
0 otherwise,
where (x)+ is defined as (x)+ = max {0, x}.
The converse for the weak adversary regime (for both
additive and overwrite jamming) follows from the standard
information-theoretic inequalities, where we use the secrecy
condition that any subset of zr = (zrw + zro) links cannot
carry any meaningful information. In the achievable scheme,
Alice needs to mix her message with zr random keys and
then use the reliable encoding scheme consisting of pairwise
hashing and erasure coding. For the strong adversary regime,
the converse is based on the Singleton-type arguments similar
to the only reliability case. We present the detail proof in
Appendix C.
C. Reliability with passive feedback
In this section, we examine the effect of passive feedback
on the capacity under jamming for both additive and overwrite
settings. For both these cases, the parameter space again
decomposes into two parts - the weak adversary regime and
strong adversary regime.
The main idea for achievability of the claimed rate in the
weak adversary regime is to use a two-round code. The first
round involves sending a code that can handle up to zrw +
zwo erasures. At the end of the first round, Alice sees the
codewords received by Bob and determines the links which
have been corrupted. In the next round, Alice sends a random
hash of all the received codewords by Bob on the uncorrupted
links from first round. Bob can then check the received values
from the second round to determine the links where the hash
values do not match the received codeword and treat those
links as erasures.
The above scheme works as long as there is at least one
link whose output is not seen by Calvin. This corresponds
exactly to the condition for the weak adversary in the following
theorems. If Calvin is able to see the output of all the links,
he is as powerful as Alice and feedback no longer helps.
Theorem 7 (Additive Jamming with Causal Feedback). Under
an additive jamming with causal feedback, the capacity is
Raddj,f =
{
0 if zr = C and C ≤ 2zw
C − zw otherwise
Theorem 8 (Overwrite Jamming with Causal Feedback). Un-
der an overwrite jamming with causal feedback, the capacity
is
Rowj,f =
{
max {C − 2zw, 0} if zro + zrw + zwo = C
C − zw otherwise
We present the detailed proof in Appendix D.
D. Reliability and secrecy with passive feedback
The schemes for secrecy are similar to that for only reliabil-
ity. The idea here is to mix appropriate number of random keys
so as to prevent Calvin from inferring meaningful information.
The protocols operate over multiple rounds. For overwrite
jamming, Alice begins with mixing zr number of keys. If
Calvin corrupts a link, Alice detects the corrupted link through
passive feedback and stops using that link from the next
round. After Calvin corrupts zwo links, for any more link
that he corrupts, Alice reduces the number of random keys
by one. In essence, Alice does not send any data on (up to)
zw links that Calvin corrupts, and uses zro number of random
keys. Roughly speaking, the scheme is secure because Calvin
does not observe anything on zrw links, and zro number of
random keys protect the data on zro links that Calvin can only
eavesdrop.
For additive jamming, Alice leverages the fact that Calvin
cannot observe data on zwo links. Here, when Calvin corrupts
a link, she starts sending random symbols on that link. The
idea is that, even after Calvin corrupts the symbols by adding
any noise of his choice, zwo of them can be used as keys for
TABLE I: The table gives expressions for the information-theoretically optimal rate regions in each scenario. The yellow cells refer to the
main results presented in [8]. The new results presented in this paper are shown in red cells. We use (x)+ to represent max {0, x}.
Model regime reliability reliability & secrecy
Non-
causal
additive zro + zwo + 2zrw < C
C − (zrw + zwo)
Cˆ − (Λzrw+zwo )max
(C − zro − zwo − 2zrw)+
zro + zwo + 2zrw ≥ C (C − 2zrw − zwo)
+
(Cˆ − (Λ2zrw+zwo )max)+
0
overwrite zro + 2zwo + 2zrw < C
C − (zrw + zwo)
Cˆ − (Λzrw+zwo )max
(C − zro − zwo − 2zrw)+
zro + 2zwo + 2zrw ≥ C (C − 2zrw − 2zwo)
+
(Cˆ − (Λ2zrw+2zwo )max)+
0
Causal w/o
feedback
additive zwo + 2zrw < C
C − (zrw + zwo)
Cˆ − (Λzrw+zwo )max
(C − zro − zwo − 2zrw)+
zwo + 2zrw ≥ C 0 0
overwrite 2zwo + 2zrw < C
C − (zrw + zwo)
Cˆ − (Λzrw+zwo )max
(C − zro − zwo − 2zrw)+
zwo + 2zrw ≥ C 0 0
Causal with
passive feedback
additive {zr = C and 2zw < C}
⋃ {zr < C} C − (zrw + zwo) min {C − zr, C − zw}
zr = C and 2zw ≥ C 0 0
overwrite zro + zwo + zrw < C C − (zrw + zwo) (C − zro − zwo − zrw)
+
zro + zwo + zrw = C (C − 2zwo − 2zrw)+ 0
the next round. This limits the number of explicit keys to be
mixed and enhances the rate.
The following theorem formally states the capacity expres-
sions for the above settings.
Theorem 9 (Secrecy capacity with Causal Feedback, Additive
Jamming). When causal passive feedback available to the
encoder, the capacity for simultaneous reliability and secrecy
is given by
Raddj,f =
{
(C − zr)+ if zr ≥ zw
(C − zw)+ if zw > zr
Theorem 10 (Secrecy capacity with Causal Feedback, Over-
write Jamming). When causal passive feedback available to
the encoder, the capacity for simultaneous reliability and
secrecy is given by
Rowj,f = (C − zro − zwo − zrw)+.
As earlier, we give the full proof in Appendix E.
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APPENDIX A
AUXILIARY LEMMAS
Definition 1 (Matrix-hashing). For any N × N square matrix
A and vector ~ρ of length N, the matrix-hash h(A, ~ρ) is defined
as ~θ = A~ρ, where ~θ is also of length N.
Lemma 1. Let q be a prime power. Suppose the N×N matrix
A is uniformly distributed over FN×Nq and the length-N non-
zero vector ~ρ is also uniformly distributed over FNq \{0}. Let Aˆ
be a random matrix independent from A and ~ρ be distributed
over FN×Nq with some distribution PAˆ(·). Then for any ~ρ not
equal to zero,
Pr
Aˆ,A,ρ
[Aˆ~ρ = A~ρ] ≤ 1
q
.
Proof: The matrices A and Aˆ are uniformly distributed over
finite field Fq , and they are also independent from each other.
Therefore the difference of the two matrices Aˆ − A should
also be a matrix which is uniformly distributed over FN×Nq .
We use the fact that a random matrix over Fq is non-invertible
with probability at most 1q . Since ~ρ is non-zero, the equation
(Aˆ − A)~ρ = 0 only if the matrix Aˆ − A is non-invertible.
Therefore we conclude that
Pr
Aˆ,A,ρ
[Aˆ~ρ = A~ρ] = Pr
Aˆ,A,ρ
[(Aˆ−A)~ρ = 0] ≤ 1
q
.
Lemma 2. Let q be a prime power and suppose the N ×
N matrix A is uniformly distributed over FN×Nq . Let θˆ be
a random length-N vector distributed over FNq independently
from A and according to an arbitrary distribution P ~ρ
θˆ
(·). Then
for any non-zero length-N vector ~ρ,
Pr
A,
~ˆ
θ
[A~ρ =
~ˆ
θ] ≤ N
q
.
Proof: Each row ~Ai of matrix A is uniformly distributed
over the finite field FNq and independent from vector ~ρ by the
definition of matrix A. For every i s.t. 1 ≤ i ≤ N , ~θi = ~Ai~ρ
is also uniformly distributed over Fq . Therefore, the vector ~θ
is uniformly distributed over FNq and for each i,
Pr
A,
~ˆ
θ
[~θi =
~ˆ
θi] ≤ 1
q
by Schwartz-Zipple Lemma. By applying the Union bound,
we conclude that
Pr
A,
~ˆ
θ
[A~ρ =
~ˆ
θ] = Pr
A,
~ˆ
θ
[~θ =
~ˆ
θ] ≤ N
q
.
APPENDIX B
PROOFS FOR RELIABLITY WITHOUT FEEDBACK
In the presence of a causal adversary, a two-part rate-
region is presented in Section IV. In this Appendix we provide
supporting proofs for Theorems 1 and 2, which provide
the claimed characterizations of the two-part rate-regions for
additive jamming and overwrite jamming.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
1) Achievability for weak adversary regime: Since the
adversary can only jam in a causal manner, a pairwise-
hashing scheme is helpful to achieve the best rate for the weak
adversary regime.
Encoder: The encoder operates over a finite field Fq , where
q = 2b and we set b = log(nC) for equal link capacities while
b = log(nCˆ) for unequal link capacities. Choose N such that
N2 + N(C + 1) = nb . The codeword consists of C vectors−→
X 1,
−→
X 2, . . . ,
−→
XC , each of length N2 + N(C + 1) over the
finite field Fq . Each
−→
X i is of the form
−→
X i = [
−→
U i
−→
K i ~hi1, ~hi2, ..., ~hiC ].
Here,
−→
U i is such that
−→
U 1,
−→
U 2, . . . ,
−→
U C together form the
codeword corresponding to the length-nRaddj bit message m
using a Reed-Solomon code of length C and rate C−zrw−zwo
over the finite field FN2q .
−→
K i is the hash key generated for each
row. The value of hash function h(
−→
U j ,
−→
K i) is defined as ~hij .
For each link Li, the encoder also appends C pairwise hashes
~hi1, ~hi2, ..., ~hiC corresponding to the C links.
Hash Function: The idea of Matrix-hashing (see Lemma 1
in Appendix A) is used for the hash function. Notice that the
randomly generated hash keys are of size N and each length-
N2 payload
−→
U i can be rearranged as a N ×N matrix Di. We
pad auxiliary bits before the packets if a square matrix cannot
be formed. The hashes ~hij is obtained from the hash function
h(
−→
U j ,
−→
K i) = Dj
−→
K i.
Decoder: After transmission, the received packet of the i-th
link Li is of the form
−→
Y i = [
−→
U ′i ~Ki
′T ~h′Ti1 ~h
′T
i2 · · ·~h′TiC ].
For each i, j, link Li and Lj are consistent if and only if
~h′ij = h(
−→
U ′j ,
−→
K ′i) and ~h
′
ji = h(
−→
U ′i,
−→
K ′j). In particular, link
Li is called self-consistent if and only if ~h′ii = h(
−→
U ′i,
−→
K ′i).
The decoder Bob first removes the links that belong to
ZWO by checking self-consistency. Then Bob constructs an
undirected graph with C vertices and for ∀i, j, he connects
the two vertices vi and vj if Li and Lj are consistent. To
detect the uncorrupted links, Bob adopts a “finding largest
clique”7 strategy, i.e., a link is assumed to be uncorrupted if
its corresponding vertex belongs to the largest clique. Finally,
Bob decodes the message from the C − zw uncorrupted links
by Reed-Solomon code.
Analysis: Before transmission, any two links are consistent
and the clique formed by Alice is of size C. After adversarial
corruption, the size of clique formed by Alice (correct clique)
is of size at least C − zw. On the other hand, Calvin may
mimic the behavior of Alice and and attempt to form a fake
clique that is as large as possible. For any two links belonging
to ZRW , Calvin is able to make them consistent since he
can modify the payload first, and then compute matching
hashes to insert. However, if link Li belongs to ZRW and
link Lj belongs to ZRO, Calvin cannot induce consistency
7The method, comes up in [5], is not an NP complete problem.
since ~h′ji 6= h(
−→
U ′i,
−→
K ′j) with high probability. This is because
with causality, Calvin doesn’t have the ability to observe
−→
K j
and ~hji when modifying
−→
U i. In this scenario, the probability
that Calvin can induce ~h′ji = h(
−→
U ′i,
−→
K ′j) is at most
1
q over
finite field Fq (see Lemma 1 in Appendix A). We would like
to make q larger, i.e., enlarge the size of the packet, to reduce
the error probability.
In conclusion, Calvin is able to form a fake clique of size
at most zrw. If Bob wishes to figure out the uncorrupted links
by finding largest clique, the size of correct clique should be
larger than the fake clique, i.e. C − zw > zrw. Therefore we
derive the condition for our weak adversary regime, which is
zwo + 2zrw < C, and the rate R = C − zrw − zwo can be
achieved. 8
2) Converse for weak adversary regime: Irrespective of the
encoding/decoding scheme, Calvin can always add uniformly
random noise to any zw links. No information can be recovered
from the zwo links and thus no rate higher than C − zw is
possible.
3) Converse for strong adversary regime: In the strong
adversary regime (zwo+2zrw ≥ C), we prove that no reliable
communication is possible no matter which encoding scheme
Alice will use. To confuse Bob, the causal adversary Calvin
will always adopt the following “symmetrization” strategy: (a)
corrupt the last zwo (resp. zwo + 1) links by adding random
noise if C − zwo is even (resp. odd), and (b) “attack" either
the top half or the bottom half of the remaining C ′ = C−zwo
(resp. C ′ = C − zwo − 1) links, where the “attack" is defined
below. This is a viable jamming strategy for Calvin since
zrw ≥ (C − zwo)/2 in the strong adversary regime. The
specific attack Calvin chooses is to pick a message m′ first
and substitute the original codewords belong to ZRW by the
codewords corresponding to m′. In this way, Bob has no idea
whether m or m′ was transmitted.
We assume the message M is uniformly distributed from
the message set M, denoted by UM . Let XR be the random
variable of the codeword. Moreover, XR(m) is used to rep-
resent the random variable of the codeword conditioned on
message m. The event Γ(m, k,m′, k′) stands for the scenario
when Alice chooses a message m and a random key k while
Calvin chooses a message m′ and a random key k′. We can
show that the probability of the event Γ(m, k,m′, k′) and the
event Γ(m′, k′,m, k) are exactly the same.
Pr[Γ(m, k,m′, k′)]
=UM (m)PXR(m)(X)UM (m
′)PXR(m′)(X
′)
=UM (m
′)PXR(m′)(X
′)UM (m)PXR(m)(X)
=Pr[Γ(m′, k′,m, k)]
Let Py(m, k,m′, k′) and Py(m′, k′,m, k) denote the distri-
butions of the received codeword conditioned on the events
Γ(m, k,m′, k′) and Γ(m′, k′,m, k) respectively. Given the
8Notice that the links belong to ZWO are also detectable by simply
checking the self-consistency. We claim a link belongs to ZWO if it is not
self-consistent. However, this process is not necessary since we can detect the
uncorrupted links by finding the largest clique.
event Γ(m, k,m′, k′), the received codeword would be either
[
−→
X 1, ...,
−→
X C′
2
,
−→
X ′C′
2 +1
, ...,
−→
X ′C′ ,
−→
NC′+1, ...,
−→
NC ]
or
[
−→
X ′1, ...,
−→
X ′C′
2
,
−→
X C′
2 +1
, ...,
−→
XC′ ,
−→
NC′+1, ...,
−→
NC ]
with equal probability. The same distribution of the code-
word will be received when the event Γ(m′, k′,m, k) hap-
pens. We conclude that the distributions Py(m, k,m′, k′) and
Py(m
′, k′,m, k) are exactly the same. Therefore Bob can-
not distinguish the events Γ(m, k,m′, k′) and Γ(m′, k′,m, k)
when decoding, and thus has no idea whether m or m′ are
transmitted. The error probability is
Pr(error) =
1
2
(1− 1
2nR
add
j
)
if Bob uses an optimal maximum-likelihood decoder (the term
1− 1
2
nRadd
j
is due to the “small” probability that the message
m′ Calvin chooses to use to confuse Bob happens to actually
match Alice’s message m).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
1) Achievability for the weak adversary regime: The
pairwise-hashing scheme also works for the overwrite jammer.
The encoding scheme here is the same as that in the additive
case. We briefly describe it below for completeness. As earlier,
we first generate a payload
−→
U i for each link Li using a
Reed-Solomon code. Next, we append the hash key and
pairwise hashes to the the payload to obtain the codeword−→
X i = [
−→
U i
−→
K i ~hi1, ~hi2, ..., ~hiC ]. After transmission, the re-
ceived packet is denoted by
−→
Y i = [
−→
U ′i ~Ki
′T ~h′Ti1 ~h
′T
i2 · · ·~h′TiC ].
As in the additive case, the decoder forms an undirected
decoding graph with C nodes and connects two vertices vi
and vj if Li and Lj are consistent. Finally, the decoder finds
the largest clique in the decoding graph to determine the set
of uncorrupted links. Although the same encoding strategy is
applied, a different rate-regime is obtained since the overwrite
jammer is slightly stronger than the additive one.
Analysis: After transmission, the size of the correct clique
is at least C − zw since Calvin doesn’t have privilege to
jam on these links. At the same time, Calvin is able to
induce a fake clique of size no larger than zrw + zwo. This is
because on the links that belong to ZRW and ZWO, Calvin
can overwrite the payloads first and then overwrite the hash
vectors with appropriately computed replacements.. Therefore
the corresponding vertices will form a clique of size zrw+zwo.
Notice that from the receiver’s perspective, the subset ZRW
is equivalent to ZWO with overwrite jamming. With additive
jamming, we have proved the fake clique that Calvin may
induce is of size zrw. Therefore as long as zrw+zwo < C−zw,
the rate R = C − zw is achievable.
2) Converse for weak adversary regime: Irrespective of
the encoding/decoding scheme, Calvin can always arbitrarily
choose a subset ZW and overwrite these links by adding
noises. As a result, at most C − zw links can carry useful
information and thus the maximum rate is at most C − zw.
3) Converse for strong adversary regime: The condition
for strong adversary regime is zrw + zwo ≥ C/2 with
overwrite jamming. In this regime, the adversary is able to
jam at least half of the C links and may perform a similar
“symmetrization” strategy. Irrespective of the coding scheme,
Calvin will (a) first pick a message m′ and a key k′ randomly
to obtain the corresponding codeword X ′, (b) then attack either
the top half or the bottom half (If C is odd, Calvin will first
“erase” one link by overwrite it with a zero packet). In this
case, the messages m and m′ are perfectly symmetric so that
Bob is unable to distinguish them.
If the event Γ(m, k,m′, k′) happens, the received codeword
would be either
[
−→
X 1, ...,
−→
X C
2
,
−→
X ′C
2 +1
, ...,
−→
X ′C ]
or
[
−→
X ′1, ...,
−→
X ′C
2
,
−→
X C
2 +1
, ...,
−→
XC ]
with equal probability. Meanwhile, the received codeword
has the same distribution when the event Γ(m′, k′,m, k)
happens. Therefore the distributions Py(m, k,m′, k′) and
Py(m
′, k′,m, k) are also the same and Bob is unable to decide
which message is transmitted. The error probability is equal
to Pr(error) = 12 (1− 12nRowj ) if a random decision is made.
APPENDIX C
PROOFS FOR RELIABLITY AND SECRECY WITHOUT
FEEDBACK
A. Proof of Theorem 5
1) Weak adversary Regime:
Converse: Consider the following strategy for Calvin. First,
on the links in ZW he adds uniformly random noise that
is independent of the codewords on other links. Next, he
eavesdrops on all ZR links. We show that, using standard
information-theoretic inequalities, that it is not possible for
Alice to reliably and secretly transmit at any rate more than
C − zw − zr. Notice that Calvin can jam any zw links and
can eavesdrop any zr links. Consider a code of length n that
achieves an error probability n and achieves perfect secrecy.
The following set of inequalities follow.
H (M) = H (M |Y ) + I (M ;Y )
(a)
≤ nn + I (M ;Y )
(b)
= nn + I (M ;Y
zw
1 ) + I
(
M ;Y Czw+1|Y zw1
)
(c)
≤ nn + I
(
M ;XCzw+1
)
(d)
≤ nn + I
(
M ;Xzw+zrzw+1
)
+ I
(
M ;XCzw+zr+1|Xzw+zrzw+1
)
(e)
≤ nn +H
(
XCzw+zr+1|Xzw+zrzw+1
)
(f)
≤ nn + C − zw − zr, (1)
where n → 0 as n → ∞. Here, (a) follows from
Fano’s inequality. Inequalities (b) and (d) follow from the
chain rule for mutual information. To obtain (c), we as-
sume without loss of generality that Calvin jams first zw
links. Then, we get I (M ;Y zw1 ) = 0, as Calvin adds uni-
form random noise independent of Alice’s transmissions.
Also, I
(
M ;Y Czw+1|Y zw1
)
= I
(
M ;Y Czw+1
)
due to inde-
pendence of added noise. Finally, we use the fact that
for the set of uncorrupted links, we have YC\ZW =
XC\ZW , which gives I
(
M ;Y Czw+1
)
= I
(
M ;XCzw+1
)
. For
getting (e), we use the fact that for any subset ZR of
links of size zr, the secrecy requirement imposes that
I (M ;XZR) = 0. Thus, I
(
M ;Xzw+zrzw+1
)
= 0. In addition, we
have I
(
M ;XCzw+zr+1|Xzw+zrzw+1
) ≤ H (XCzw+zr+1|Xzw+zrzw+1 ).
Lastly, (f) follows from the fact H
(
XCzw+zr+1|Xzw+zrzw+1
) ≤
H
(
XCzw+zr+1
) ≤ C − zw − zr, where the second inequality
is due to unit link capacities.
Achievability: Alice first appends n(C − zw − zr) message
symbols with nzr uniform random key symbols to form
n(C−zw) super-message symbols. Then, she uses the achiev-
able scheme mentioned in the proof of Theorem 1 (case 1)
composed of a (C,C−zw) Reed-Solomon code together with
the pairwise hashing scheme. We require that the generator
matrix of the Reed-Solomon code consists of a Cauchy matrix.
Now, Bob can locate the set ZW of corrupted links using
pairwise hashing and uses the Reed-Solomon code to decode
the super-message symbols from the remaining links. Then,
Bob separates the random keys and the message symbols from
the super-message symbols, since the first n(C − zw − zr)
symbols of the super-message are the message symbols.
For secrecy, we show that Calvin cannot infer any infor-
mation from the links he eavesdrops. We denote the set of
random keys by k and the corresponding random variable
by K. Further, let XZR denote the links being eavesdropped.
Consider the following set of inequalities.
I (M ;XZR) = H (XZR)−H (XZR |M)
(g)
≤ nzr −H (XZR |M)
(h)
≤ nzr −H (XZR |M) +H (XZR |M,K)
(i)
= nzr − I (XZR ;K|M)
(j)
= nzr −H (K|M) +H (K|M,XZR)
(k)
= nzr −H (K) +H (K|M,XZR)
(l)
≤ H (K|M,XZR) , (2)
where (g) follows from from the fact that each link has
unit capacity and Calvin can eavesdrop at most zr links, (h)
follows from the non-negativity of entropy, (i) and (j) follow
from the definition of mutual information, (k) follows because
keys are independent of the message, and (l) follows from
the fact that the keys are uniform random, giving H (K) =
nzr. Now, in order to prove secrecy, we need to show that
H (K|M,XZR) = 0. In other words, one can decode the
keys from XZR and M . Let G(XZR ) denote the rows of the
Cauchy generator matrix corresponding to the symbols XZR .
Therefore, we have
XZR = G(XZR )
[
M
K
]
.
To prove that H (K|M,XZR) = 0, one needs to show that
the following system of linear equations can be solved.
XZR =
[
G(XZR )
I | O
] [
M
K
]
, (3)
where I denotes identity matrix of size n(C−zw−zr)×n(C−
zw−zr), and O denotes zero matrix of size n(C−zw−zr)×
nzr. First notice that G(XZR ) is a Cauchy matrix since it is a
sub-matrix of a Cauchy matrix. Then, using the property that
any square sub-matrix of a Cauchy matrix is non-singular, it is
straightforward to show that the matrix
[
G(XZR )
I | O
]
is invertible.
Therefore, the linear system (3) can be inverted, and we have
H (K|M,XZR) = 0.
2) Strong adversary Regime: Notice that even in the ab-
sence of secrecy, no positive rate is achievable in this regime.
Adding the extra requirement of secrecy can only decrease the
communication rate. Thus no communication at positive rate
is possible in this regime.
B. Proof of Theorem 6
For the weak adversary case, the converse and achievability
proofs follow from the same arguments as in the proof of
Theorem 5 and is omitted for brevity.
For the strong adversary regime, the rate without the secrecy
requirement is zero. This implies that no positive rate is
possible when secrecy condition is added on top of reliability.
APPENDIX D
PROOF FOR RELIABILITY WITH PASSIVE FEEDBACK
A. Proof of Theorem 7
Noting that the rate cannot exceed C − zw even with
feedback (since Calvin can always inject random noise on zw
links). Therefore, to prove the claim of Theorem 7, it suffices
to show the following:
• (a). C − zw is achievable whenever zr < C or C > 2zw,
• (b). No positive rate is possible when zr = C and C ≤
2zw.
1) Proof of (a): We prove the achievability of the rate C−
zw by partitioning the parameter set Zaddpos,fb = {zr < C} ∪
{C > 2zw} into disjoint sets Z1 = {zr < C} and Z2 =
{zr = C} ∩ {C > 2zw}, and using different coding schemes
in the two sets.
Achievability for Z1: The code operates over two rounds. In
the first round, Alice uses an erasure code of length C capable
of correcting upto zw erasures. Upon observing the codewords
received by Bob (through passive feedback), Alice computes
random hashes of each of the C received codewords and sends
these hashes on the links which are not corrupted in the first
round.
Formally, we show that the rate C − zw is achievable
(and hence, any smaller rate is also achievable). Alice first
chooses a blocklength n > dlog2 Ce and encodes an nR-bit
message over n+C
√
n time slots using a two-round scheme
as follows. Round 1: In the first round, Alice uses n time
slots to transmit using the following scheme. Alice treats m
as R consecutive symbols m1,m2, . . . ,mR from a finite field
F2n of size 2n. Next, Alice encodes (m1,m2, . . . ,mR) to
X(1) = (x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2 , . . . , x
(1)
C ) using a Reed-Solomon code ca-
pable of correcting upto zw erasures and sends x
(1)
i on the link
Li for each i = 1, 2, . . . , C. These codewords are corrupted
by Calvin and Bob receives Y (1) = (y(1)1 , y
(1)
2 , . . . , y
(1)
C ).
Alice also observes Y (1) causally using the passive feedback
available to her. Based on her observation, Alice partitions
L1, L2, . . . , LC into two sets – ZX consisting of all links Li
where x(1)i = y
(1)
i and Z× consisting of all links Li where
xi 6= yi. Note that Z× ⊆ ZW ( {L1, L2, · · · , LC}.
Round 2: In the second round, Alice uses the feed-
back seen from first round and transmits random hashes
over 2C
√
n time slots using the following scheme. Alice
picks C independent random keys ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρC and com-
putes hashes h(y(1)1 , ρ1), h(y
(1)
2 , ρ2), . . ., h(y
(1)
C , ρC), each
of length d√ne using the matrix hash scheme (See Ap-
pendix A). Next, Alice transmits the codeword x(2)i =
[h(y
(1)
1 , ρ1) h(y
(1)
2 , ρ2) . . . h(y
(1)
C , ρC) ρ1 ρ2 . . . ρC ] on every
link Li ∈ ZX and a random length-2C
√
n vector x(2)i on every
link Li ∈ Z×.
Decoding: Bob first partitions the set of links into sets ZˆX
and Zˆ× using the following classification.
• If Bob determines that the hash values and keys specified
by y(2)i are consistent with all the received codewords in
the first round, i.e., Y (1), he assigns Li to ZˆX.
• Else, Bob assigns Li to Zˆ×.
Finally, if the size of ZˆX is at least as large as C − zw, Bob
uses the codewords (x(1)i : Li ∈ ZˆX) to decode the message.
Else, he declares an error.
Analysis: Note that ZˆX includes every link that is not cor-
rupted by Calvin (and possibly some other links as well). Thus,
|ZˆX| ≥ C − zw. Since the Reed-Solomon erasure correcting
code can recover X(1) from any C−zw correct symbols out of
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2 , . . . , x
(1)
C , in order to prove that Bob can successfully
decode m with a high probability, it is sufficient to show that
Z× ⊆ Zˆ× with a high probability. Without loss of generality,
we show the above when zw < C (since zero rate is trivially
achieved when zw = C).
Let Ls ∈ Z×. Since zr < C, there is at least one link Lt
such that y(1)t is observed by Bob (and hence by Alice), but
not by Calvin. This implies that in the second round, even
if Calvin knows ρt, he can only randomly guess a consistent
replacement for h(y(1)t , ρt). Thus,
Pr
(
Z× * Zˆ×
)
≤ Pr
(
s ∈ ZˆX
∣∣∣s ∈ Z×)
= Pr
(
y(2)s = [h(y
(1)
1 , ρˆ1) . . . h(y
(1)
C , ρˆC) ρˆ1 . . . ρˆC ]
for some ρˆ1, . . . , ρˆC
)
≤ Pr
x
(2)
t ,y
(2)
s
((
y(2)s
)d√nes
d√ne(s−1)+1
= h(y
(1)
t , ρˆt)
∣∣∣∣ρˆt)
≤ 2−
√
n.
In the above, the upper bound on the guessing probability
follows from Lemma 2.
Achievability for Z2: In this parameter setting, we note that
since zr = C, ZW = ZRW and ZWO = ∅. Using the fact that
zw < C/2, Theorem 1, we can achieve a rate C − zrw − zwo
without using feedback.
2) Proof of (b): Next, we show that zr = C and Calvin
controls more than half the links, Bob cannot distinguish
between Alice and Calvin. Let Z1 = {L1, . . . , LbC/2c} and
Z2 = {LdC/2e+1, . . . , LC}. Let ZE = {LdC/2e} if C is odd,
and ∅ otherwise. Note that |Z1| = |Z2| < zw.
For any message m and any code chose by Alice, Calvin’s
attack strategy is the following. First, Calvin adds a uniformly
random noise sequence on any link in ZE . Next, he selects a
random message m′ and chooses a set Z ′ uniformly at random
from {Z1, Z2}. Finally, he uses Alice’s coding strategy to
encode the message m′ over the links in Z ′. Calvin can do
this as zr = C and therefore, anything that is seen by Alice
and Bob is also seen by Calvin.
Now, Bob is unable to reliably distinguish between follow-
ing two cases:
• Alice’s message is m and Calvin’s message is m′.
• Alice’s message is m′ and Calvin’s message is m.
Thus, the probability of error for Bob is at least 1/4 if Alice’s
rate is non-zero.
B. Proof of Theorem 8
From the point of view of the proof of Theorem 7, the
overwrite jamming case differs from the additive one only in
the respect that even on the links in ZWO, Calvin knows the
output (since he can replace it with anything of his choice).
Thus the scheme from the proof of Theorem 7 works only if
there is at least one link which is neither seen nor corrupted
by Calvin.
The converse also follows similar arguments. If Calvin can
see the output on all the links, he can follow a symmetrization
strategy to confuse Bob if the rate is larger than C − 2(zrw +
zwo). The idea is that if Calvin sees everything also seen by
Bob and Alice, he can follow’s Alice’s coding scheme exactly
but with a different message.
The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem
7, and so we omit it here.
APPENDIX E
CAUSAL JAMMING WITH PASSIVE FEEDBACK AND
SECRECY
A. Proof of Theorem 9
Note that the converse arguments in this case are straight-
forward. When zw ≥ zr, the rate cannot exceed C − zw
since Calvin can always inject random noise on zw links.
When zr > zw, any set of zr links cannot carry meaningful
information due to secrecy requirement, which results in the
rate C − zr.
We present the proof of achievability for the regime zr ≥
zw. The scheme for zw > zr is analogous.
Encoding: The protocol operates over multiple rounds in four
stages. Alice divides nR-bit message into NR number of
symbols, where N < n is such that N |n. Observe that each
symbol is over the finite field Fq of size q = 2n/N . Let z˜w,
z˜w ≤ zw, be the number of links that Calvin chooses to corrupt
in first N rounds. Let ij be the round at which Calvin chooses
to corrupt j-th of the zw links that he can corrupt. Notice that
1 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 ≤ · · · ≤ iz˜w ≤ N . In each round, Alice transmits
encoded symbols over C links as described below.
Stage 1: The first stage is from rounds 1 ≤ i ≤ i1. In
the first stage, in each round, Alice encodes R = C − zr
message symbols (each over F2n/N ) together with zr random
keys (chosen uniformly and independently over F2n/N ). Let
us denote the R message symbols transmitted during i-th
round as m(i)1 ,m
(i)
2 , · · · ,m(i)R , and the zr random keys as
k
(i)
1 , k
(i)
2 , · · · , k(i)zr . Then, alice generates C encoded symbols
for the i-th round as

x
(i)
1
x
(i)
2
...
x
(i)
C
 = G

m
(i)
1
...
m
(i)
R
k
(i)
1
...
k
(i)
zr

, (4)
where G is a C × C Cauchy matrix with each entry from
F2n/N .
Stage 2: The second stage is from rounds i1 + 1 ≤
i ≤ N . Consider the case when Calvin has corrupted the
j-th link (1 ≤ j ≤ z˜w). Since Alice can overhear the
transmissions till round ij , she knows the links that Calvin
has corrupted so far. We denote the set of corrupted links
as Zijw = {l1, · · · , lj}, and its complement as Z¯(ij)w . Let
y
(i−1)
Z
ij
w
= {y(i−1)l1 , y
(i−1)
l2
, · · · , y(i−1)lj } be the set of codewords
received by Bob in round i− 1 on the corrupted links. Then,
the codewords transmitted in round i (i1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ N), in
stage 2, are given as
x
(i)
Z¯
(ij)
w
= G
Z¯
(ij)
w

m
(i)
1
...
m
(i)
R
k
(i)
1
...
k
(i)
zr−j
y
(i−1)
Z
(ij)
w

, (5)
x
(i)
Z
(ij)
w
=

k
(i)
zr−j+1
...
k
(i)
zr
 , (6)
where G
Z¯
(ij)
w
is the sub-matrix of G formed by taking the
rows of G corresponding to indices in the set Z¯(ij)w .
Stage 3: Since Alice overhears the symbols received by
Bob in each round, Alice can easily determine i1, i2, · · · , iz˜w .
In stage 3, Alice sends pair of corrupted links and corrupted
indices, i.e., x(N+1)l = {i1, l1; i2, l2; · · · ; iz˜w , lz˜w}, on all of
the links 1 ≤ l ≤ C.
Stage 4: In the last stage, Alice computes a randomized
hash of y(1:N+1)l for each 1 ≤ l ≤ C, as follows. First,
Alice picks C independent random keys ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρC and
computes hashes H = {h(y(1:N+1)1 , ρ1), h(y(1:N+1)2 , ρ2), . . .,
h(y
(1:N+1)
C , ρC)}, each of length d
√
ne using the matrix hash
scheme (see appendix). Next, Alice transmits the hash H on
every link Ll ∈ L
Z¯
(iz˜w
)
w
and a random n-length vector k(N+2)l
on every link Ll ∈ L
Z
(iz˜w
)
w
.
Decoding: The first phase of decoding works in the same way
as in the scheme without secrecy. Bob first partitions the set of
links into sets ZˆX and Zˆ× using the following classification.
• For each llink Ll, if Bob determines that the hash values
and keys specified by Hl are consistent with all the
received codewords on that link in the first three stages,
i.e., y(1:N+1), he assigns Ll to ZˆX.
• Else, Bob assigns Ll to Zˆ×.
From the links in ZˆX, Bob determines the corrupted links and
the rounds from which Bob started corrupting the links, i.e.,
{i1, l1; i2, l2; · · · ; iz˜w , lz˜w}. Bob then decodes the codewords
for each round starting from round 1 using the appropriate
links for each round. In particular, he uses all the links for
rounds 1 ≤ i ≤ i1 − 1, all the links except l1 for rounds
i1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ i2 − 1, and so on. If the set ZˆX is empty, he
declares an error.
Analysis for decoding: Note that ZˆX includes every link that
is not corrupted by Calvin. In order to prove that Bob can
successfully decode m with a high probability, first, we need
to show that Z(izw )w = Zˆ× with a high probability. This proof
is analogous to the case without secrecy.
Next, we need to show that Bob can decode for each round.
In stage 1, till rounds i1 − 1, no link is corrupted by Calvin.
Thus, Bob can use (4) and invert G to decode the messages
(and keys as well). In stage 2, let us consider the rounds from
ij + 1 ≤ i ≤ ij+1 − 1. In each of these rounds, notice that on
uncorrupted links Z¯(ij)w , we have y
(i)
Z¯
(ij)
w
= x
(i)
Z¯
(ij)
w
. Thus, Bob
can use (5) along with the received codewords in previous
round on corrupted links y(i−1)
Z
(ij)
w
to get the following system
of equations
x(i)Z¯(ij)w
y
(i−1)
Z
(ij)
w
 = [GZ¯(ij)w
0 | Ij
]

m
(i)
1
...
m
(i)
R
k
(i)
1
...
k
(i)
zr−j
y
(i−1)
Z
(ij)
w

, (7)
where 0 is a j ×C − j zero matrix and Ij is a j × j identity
matrix. Using the property of Cauchy matrix that any of its
square sub-matrices is non-singular, it is easy to show that one
can solve (7).
Remark: Note that in each of the rounds i1, i2, · · · , iz˜w , Bob
cannot decode the message symbols since Calvin corrupts the
new link. Therefore, the number of symbols (messages plus
keys) that can be correctly conveyed to Bob is N − z˜w ≥
N − zw → N for large N .
Analysis for secrecy: We show that in any round, Calvin does
not get any information about the message symbols. In the
first stage, in round i, 1 ≤ i ≤ i1, Calvin gets the following
system of equations on the links Zr that he can observe:
x
(i)
Zr
= GZr

m
(i)
1
...
m
(i)
R
k
(i)
1
...
k
(i)
zr

, (8)
where GZr is the sub-matrix of G rows corresponding to links
in Zw. Using the properties of Cauchy matrix, we can prove
that I
(
M ;x
(i)
Zr
)
= 0 using the same steps as in the case
without passive feedback.
Next, we prove secrecy for every round i, i1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
in stage 2. Consider the case that Calvin has corrupted j links,
1 ≤ j ≤ z˜w. Let z˜(j)rw be the number of corrupted links that
Calvin can also eavesdrop, and z˜(j)wo be the remaining corrupted
links (z˜(j)rw + z˜
(j)
wo = j). Note that Calvin observes (left hand
side of) the following system of equations:
[
x
(i)
zr
y
(i−1)
z˜
(j)
rw
]
=
[
Gzr
0 | I
z˜
(j)
rw
]

m
(i)
1
...
m
(i)
R
k
(i)
1
...
k
(i)
zr−j
y
(i−1)
z˜
(j)
wo
y
(i−1)
z˜
(j)
rw

, (9)
where 0 is a j × z˜(j)wo zero matrix, and Iz˜(j)rw is z˜
(j)
rw × z˜(j)rw
identity matrix. Out of the eavesdropped codewords x(i)zr , the
ones on the read-write links are random keys (12). Thus, in
round i, the number of codewords containing messages that
are observed by Calvin is zro + zrw − z˜(j)wo = zr − z˜(j)wo .
Now, observe that Alice mixes zro−j explicit random keys.
Out of the randomness generated over j corrupted links by
Calvin Z(ij)w using previous round codewords, Calvin knows
y
(i−1)
z˜
(j)
rw
due to his eavesdropping power on those links. Since
he cannot eavesdrop on remaining of the j links, y(i−1)
z˜
(j)
wo
act
as random keys. Thus, the total number of random keys used
by Alice are (zro − j) + (j − z˜(j)rw ) = zro − z˜(j)rw . Hence, the
number of keys equals the number of observed codewords. We
can prove that no information is leaked using the properties
of Cauchy matrix, using the same technique as in the case
without passive feedback.
B. Proof of Theorem 10
The flavor of the scheme and the proof remains the same as
above. The key difference is the following. In stage 2, when
Calvin corrupts a link, Alice stops using that link and, on the
contrary to the additive noise case, she does not initially reduce
the number of explicit keys. After Calvin corrupts zwo links,
for each additional corrupted link starting with (zwo + 1)-
th link, Alice reduces the number of explicit keys by one.
Besides, she also stops using that link. Therefore, essentially,
Alice does not send any data on (up to) zw links, and on
remaining links she mixes message symbols with (at least)
zro random keys for secrecy.
We first present achievability scheme.
Encoding: The protocol operates over multiple rounds in four
stages. Alice divides nR-bit message into NR number of
symbols, where N < n is such that N |n. Observe that each
symbol is over the finite field Fq of size q = 2n/N . Let z˜w,
z˜w ≤ zw, be the number of links that Calvin chooses to corrupt
in first N rounds. Let ij be the round at which Calvin chooses
to corrupt j-th of the zw links that he can corrupt. Notice that
1 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 ≤ · · · ≤ iz˜w ≤ N . In each round, Alice transmits
encoded symbols over C links as described below.
Stage 1: The first stage is from rounds 1 ≤ i ≤ i1. In the
first stage, in each round, Alice enodes R = C−zro−zwo−zrw
message symbols (each over F2n/N ) together with zr random
keys (chosen uniformly and independently over F2n/N ). Let
us denote the R message symbols transmitted during i-th
round as m(i)1 ,m
(i)
2 , · · · ,m(i)R , and the zr random keys as
k
(i)
1 , k
(i)
2 , · · · , k(i)zr . Then, Alice generates C encoded symbols
for the i-th round as follows.

x
(i)
1
x
(i)
2
...
x
(i)
C
 = G

m
(i)
1
...
m
(i)
R
k
(i)
1
...
k
(i)
zr

, (10)
where G is a C × C − zwo Cauchy matrix with each entry
from F2n/N .
Stage 2: The second stage is from rounds i1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Consider the case when Calvin has corrupted the j-th link (1 ≤
j ≤ z˜w). Since Alice can overhear the transmissions till round
ij , she knows the links that Calvin has corrupted so far. Once
Calvin corrupts a link, Alice starts sending random symbols on
that link from the next round. Essentially, Alice stops using the
corrupted links for any meaningful transmission. If j ≤ zwo,
Alice keeps mixing zr keys, else she reduces the number of
keys by one for each corrupted link.
To describe this formally, we denote the set of j links that
have been corrupted up to round ij as Z
ij
w = {l1, · · · , lj}, and
its complement as Z¯(ij)w . The codewords transmitted in round
i (i1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ N), in stage 2, are given as
x
(i)
Z¯
(ij)
w
= G
Z¯
(ij)
w

m
(i)
1
...
m
(i)
R
k
(i)
1
...
k
(i)
zr−(j−zwo)+

, (11)
where G
Z¯
(ij)
w
is the sub-matrix of G formed by taking the
rows of G corresponding to indices in the set Z¯(ij)w and first
R+ zr − (j − zwo)+ columns, and
x
(i)
Z
(ij)
w
=

k
(i)
zr−(j−zwo)++1
...
k
(i)
zr−(j−zwo)++j
 . (12)
Stage 3: Since Alice overhears the symbols received by
Bob in each round, Alice can easily determine i1, i2, · · · , iz˜w .
In stage 3, Alice sends pair of corrupted links and corrupted
indices, i.e., x(N+1)l = {i1, l1; i2, l2; · · · ; iz˜w , lz˜w}, on all of
the links 1 ≤ l ≤ C.
Stage 4: The last stage is similar to the second stage in
the scheme for only reliability. The purpose of this stage is to
allow Bob to determine the corrupted links and the correspond-
ing rounds. In this stage, Alice computes a randomized hash
of the symbols received by Bob in the previous N rounds,
i.e., y(1:N+1)l , for each link 1 ≤ l ≤ C, as follows. First,
Alice picks C independent random keys ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρC and
computes hashes Hl = h(y
(1:N+1)
l , ρl, 1 ≤ l ≤ C, each of
length d√ne using the matrix hash scheme (see appendix).
Next, Alice transmits the hash H on every uncorrupted link
Ll ∈ L
Z¯
(iz˜w
)
w
and a random Cd√ne-length vector k(N+2)l on
every corrupted link Ll ∈ L
Z
(iz˜w
)
w
.
Decoding: The first phase of decoding works in the same way
as in the scheme without secrecy. Bob first partitions the set of
links into sets ZˆX and Zˆ× using the following classification.
• For each llink Ll, if Bob determines that the hash values
and keys specified by Hl are consistent with all the
received codewords on that link in the first three stages,
i.e., y(1:N+1), he assigns Ll to ZˆX.
• Else, Bob assigns Ll to Zˆ×.
From the links in ZˆX, Bob determines the corrupted links and
the corresponding rounds from which Bob started corrupting
the links, i.e., {i1, l1; i2, l2; · · · ; iz˜w , lz˜w}. Bob then decodes
the codewords for each round starting from round 1 using the
appropriate links for that round. In particular, he uses all the
links for rounds 1 ≤ i ≤ i1 − 1, all the links except l1 for
rounds i1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ i2− 1, and so on. If the set ZˆX is empty,
he declares an error.
Analysis for decoding: Note that ZˆX includes every link that
is not corrupted by Calvin. In order to prove that Bob can
successfully decode m with a high probability, first, we need
to show that Z(izw )w = Zˆ× with a high probability. This proof
is analogous to the case without secrecy.
Next, we need to show that Bob can decode for each round.
In stage 1, till rounds i1 − 1, no link is corrupted by Calvin.
Thus, Bob can use (10) and use any C − zwo rows of G to
decode the messages (and keys as well).9
In stage 2, let us consider the rounds from ij + 1 ≤ i ≤
ij+1 − 1. In each of these rounds, notice that on uncorrupted
links Z¯(ij)w , we have y
(i)
Z¯
(ij)
w
= x
(i)
Z¯
(ij)
w
. Thus, Bob can use (15)
to get the following system of equations
x
(i)
Z¯
(ij)
w
= G
Z¯
(ij)
w

m
(i)
1
...
m
(i)
R
k
(i)
1
...
k
(i)
zr−(j−zwo)+

. (13)
Observe that the number of rows of G
Z¯
(ij)
w
is C−j, while the
number of columns is R+ zr− (j− zwo)+ = C− zwo− (j−
zwo)
+. If j ≤ zwo, Bob can consider any C − zwo rows of
the Cauchy matrix G
Z¯
(ij)
w
to decode for the message and key
symbols. If j > zwo, G
Z¯
(ij)
w
is square and it is non-singular
being a Cauchy matrix.
Remark: Note that in each of the rounds i1, i2, · · · , iz˜w , Bob
cannot decode the message symbols since Calvin corrupts the
new link. Therefore, the number of symbols (messages plus
keys) that can be correctly conveyed to Bob is N − z˜w ≥
N − zw → N for large N .
Analysis for secrecy: We show that in any round, Calvin does
not get any information about the message symbols. In the
first stage, in round i, 1 ≤ i ≤ i1, Calvin gets the following
system of equations on the links Zr that he can observe:
x
(i)
Zr
= GZr

m
(i)
1
...
m
(i)
R
k
(i)
1
...
k
(i)
zr

, (14)
where GZr is the sub-matrix of G rows corresponding to links
in Zw. Using the properties of Cauchy matrix, we can prove
that I
(
M ;x
(i)
Zr
)
= 0 using the same steps as in the case for
secrecy without passive feedback.
Next, we prove secrecy for every round i, i1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
in stage 2. Consider the case that Calvin has corrupted j links,
1 ≤ j ≤ z˜w. Let z˜(j)rw be the number of corrupted links that
Calvin can also eavesdrop, and z˜(j)wo be the remaining corrupted
links (z˜(j)rw + z˜
(j)
wo = j). Note that Calvin observes (left hand
9Here, we use the property of a Cauchy matrix that any of its square sub-
matrices is non-singular.
side of) the following system of equations:
[
x
(i)
zrw−z˜(j)rw
x
(i)
zro
]
= G
zrw−z˜(j)rw+zro

m
(i)
1
...
m
(i)
R
k
(i)
1
...
k
(i)
zr−(j−zwo)+

, (15)
x
(i)
z˜
(j)
rw
=

k
(i)
zr−(j−zwo)++1
...
k
(i)
zr−(j−zwo)++z˜(j)rw
 , (16)
On z˜(j)rw links, Calvin observes random keys. Thus, we need
to worry about the remaining of the zr − z˜(j)rw links that he
eavesdrops. The number of random key symbols mixed with
message symbols is zr−(j−zwo)+. If j ≤ zwo, the number of
mixed keys is zr, while if j > zwo, the number of mixed keys
is zr−(j−zwo) = zr−z˜(j)rw−z˜(j)wo+zwo. Since z˜(j)wo ≤ zwo, it is
easy to see that the number of mixed keys is greater than equal
to the number of eavesdropped symbols involving messages.
Using the properties of Cauchy matrix, one can easily prove
that the secrecy requirement is satisfied.
Converse: Consider a strategy for Calvin wherein he over-
writes zero symbols on the zwo links that he can only corrupt.
He eavesdrops all the zr links of his choice. We consider that
the communication is over multiple rounds, say t number of
rounds.
H (M) = H
(
M |Y (1:n)
)
+ I
(
M ;Y (1:n)
)
(a)
≤ nn + I
(
M ;Y (1:n)
)
(b)
= nn + I
(
M ;Y
(1:n)
zro+zrw
)
+ I
(
M ;Y (1:n)zwo |Y (1:n)zro+zrw
)
+ I
(
M ;Y
(1:n)
C−zwo−zro−zrw |Y
(1:n)
zwo+zro+zrw
)
(c)
= nn + I
(
M ;Y
(1:n)
C−zwo−zro−zrw |Y
(1:n)
zro+zwo+zrw
)
≤ nn +H
(
Y
(1:n)
C−zwo−zro−zrw
)
(d)
≤ nn + n(C − zwo − zro − zrw),
where n → 0 as n → ∞. Here, (a) follows
from Fano’s inequality, (b) follows from the chain rule
of mutual information. To obtain (c), first note that
I
(
M ;Y
(1:n)
zro+zrw
)
≤ I
(
M ;X
(1:n)
zro+zrw
)
by data processing
inequality. But, for secrecy, we need I
(
M ;X
(1:n)
zro+zrw
)
= 0.
Also, I
(
M ;Y
(1:n)
zwo |Y (1:n)zro+zrw
)
= 0 since Y (1:n)zwo = 0 due to
Calvin’s attack strategy. Finally, (d) follows from unit link
capacities.
